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A B S T R A C T
This paper explores how an analytical focus on the governing of resources and mentalities based on the
Foucauldian notion of governmentality widens the understanding of political processes relating to the
creation of a knowledge-based approach to potentially opening for petroleum extraction in Lofoten, Norway.
As pressure intensiﬁes for extractive resource exploitation in the Norwegian Arctic, policy processes are
characterized by the construction of governance regimes depending on techno-scientiﬁc knowledge upon
which political decisions are to be made. Through analyzing the revision of the Integrated Management Plan
for the Barents and Lofoten Seas (IMP-BL) in 2011, this paper addresses (i) that the continued construction of a
nature/culture divide is an important basis for governance of nature and natural resources, where (ii) the
rationale of scientiﬁc truth-telling practices are projected onto political processes, which in turn leads to a
processof(iii)governingmentalities besides governingactions, andﬁnally (iv)how the creationofa Scientiﬁc
Forum Report as a basis for the management plan in effect is what Foucault identiﬁed as a technology of
security, aiming ultimately at securing population,- a technique that reﬂects a speciﬁc power/knowledge
nexus that necessitates processes of inclusion and exclusion of knowledge, values and stakeholder views.
ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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journal homepage: www.else vie r .com/ locat e/e xis“An analytics of government attempts to show that our
taken-for-granted ways of doing things and how we think about
and question them are not entirely self-evident or necessary. An
analysis of a particular regime of practices ( . . . ) examines how
such a regime gives rise to and depends upon particular forms
of knowledge” (Dean, 2010: 31)
1. Introduction
Thispaperanalyses how knowledge productionusedasa basis for
the political process of producing a revised Management plan for the
ocean areas of the Barents and Lofoten Seas (Government, 2011) was
politicized through the governing of practices of inclusion and
exclusion of knowledge into what was called its knowledge base1,E-mail address: brigt.dale@nforsk.no (B. Dale).
1 This concept is well-known and broadly used by politicians, lobbyists, NGOs,
journalists and political commentators and so on when describing the usage of
knowledge as basis for political debates and decisions. It was also extensively
referred to by researchers and scientists in charge of the process of gathering and
presenting the Scientiﬁc Forum Report, and its importance as a gate-keeping
concept (i.e. a process of governing information ﬂow through a ﬁlter between
speciﬁc cultures of knowledge, here meaning those of science and politics, see
discussion in Section 6) was conﬁrmed in a recent telephone interview with the
main coordinator of the report, Dr. Cecilie von Quillfeldt, in May 2015.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.10.002
2214-790X/ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unﬁrst and foremost provided in a Scientiﬁc Forum Report. This was
done, I argue, through processes in which speciﬁc institutions are
selected as those with the power to decide who delivers relevant
knowledge for the establishment of a Scientiﬁc Forum Report meant
to form a factual basis upon which decisions would be made.
Analytically, I label this a process of managing resources and
mentalities, as it exempliﬁes nicely the theoretical argument that
speciﬁc ways of governing are closely tied to speciﬁc mentalities or
ontologies, in the sense that they refer to a speciﬁc ordering of the
world, as will be presented below. A number of interrelated social
science traditions deal with the interrelationship between
knowledge, power, networks and politics, such as cultural theory
of risks (see for instance Douglas and Wildavsky,1982), science and
technology studies (Jasanoff et al., 1995,Jasanoff, 2004) and actor-
network theory (Latour, 1987; Law and Singleton, 2013) – and I will
show how a governmentality approach (Foucault, 2008; Dean,
2010) is fruitful in revealing the processes through which speciﬁc
types of knowledge are included into the power/knowledge nexus
supporting the system through which the Norwegian government
manages its natural resources.
In the following, a brief introduction to the methodological
considerations for the article is discussed before a short section
describing the empirical setting, the Lofoten islands in Northern
Norway. This presentation is followed by an introduction of theder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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in the sea areas just outside the archipelago, before the analysis of
the process I have termed the government of resources and
mentalities is presented.
2. Data and methodology
The data material for studying the processes leading up to the
publication of the revised Management plan is extensive, and thus,
I have selected data that serves as an example of how the governing
of both resources and ontologies can be analyzed within a
governmentality framework.2 The analysis in this paper is thus
based on the following data sources:
- the Scientiﬁc Forum report (von Quillfeldt, 2010) and the revised
Management plan for the Barents and Lofoten Seas (Govern-
ment, 2011) as well as underlying reports and scientiﬁc work;
- participation at a hearing conference after the release of the
revised management plan; and
- ethnographic material collected during multiple ﬁeldwork trips
to the region from May 2008–August 2011.3
Included in the ethnographic material are the transcripts and
notes taken from roughly 50 open ended interviews and
conversations with stakeholders in and beyond the region, all
involved in and/ or inﬂuenced by the process here described and
analyzed. In addition, ethnographic ﬁeld notes and experiences
constitute an important backdrop for the analysis.4
This methodological stance requires a note of clariﬁcation. I
concur with writers such as Schatz (2009); Comaroff and Comaroff
(2003); Herbert (2000) in that political ethnography is concerned
both with method, characterized typically by ﬁeldwork in which
participant observation meaning “ . . . the immersion in a com-
munity, a cohort, a locale, or a cluster of related subject positions”
(Schatz ibid: 5) is important, and with a certain sensibility, “ . . . an
approach that cares . . . ” (ibid). What this means, I believe, is to
focus on the social and political realities as they are being co-
produced in settings in which the ethnographer him/herself is a co-
producer – with a particular sensitivity to the rationale present in
that same social setting as it is presented by the protagonists;
presenting politics as it is produced, understood and interpreted
locally. Immersion and sensibility imply a particular (and often
personal) connection to the ﬁeld of study; a connection which
enables the researcher to analyze political processes based on an
awareness of the social, cultural and political backdrop of the
community in question. Thus, Comaroff and Comaroff write, “(t) he
role of ( . . . ethnography . . . ) has been to show that, even in the
act of accommodating to ineluctable macro-cosmic forces,
different peoples do things differently, be it because of their
distinctive cultures, their social situations, or their will to resist
( . . . ) The epistemic consequences that follow are plain enough: a
committed realism, and a form of relativism that sits uneasily with
‘general’ theory grounded in history, philosophy, political econo-
my . . . (2003ibid: 154). The following presentation and analysis2 This process of selection should not be understood as one where only data that
serves to support a particular argument has been chosen, but rather that it makes
up an example of how the governmentality framework can fruitfully be applied to
this sort of decision making processes.
3 In total, an estimated period of about eight months was spent in ﬁeld during this
period, dispersed over more than ﬁfteen ﬁeldwork trips.
4 The data material was collected as part of my PhD work (Dale, 2011), ﬁnanced
through the research project IPY GAPS: The Impacts of Oil and Gas Activity on
Peoples in the Arctic. The overall ﬁndings of the project will be presented in the
forthcoming Springer anthology “From Pole to Pole: Polar Environmental Research
during the International Polar Year 2007–2009, edited by Susan Barr, Guido di
Prisco, David Walton and Roland Kallenborn.aims to show that there are different ways of understanding
knowledge, values, responsibilities and concerns that deserve to be
presented, analyzed and included in the debates concerning the
management of natural resources. What I have learned during my
time in the Lofoten region will thus be instrumental to the way I
analyze and interpret the processes much like local actors and
stakeholders do.
3. Backdrop: Where are we?
The Lofoten islands, situated at 67 degrees north – just above
the Arctic circle – have for centuries been an essential area for
income and resource management,- for state and citizens alike.
The state has over centuries earned revenues from ﬁsheries in this
region that far surpass those of the latest decades from the
petroleum industry. Merchants and traders have prospered, and
ﬁshers have earned a living. Annually, up to 40,000 ﬁshers (more
than double the resident population) would come to ﬁsh during
the winter season when the North Atlantic cod enters the waters
outside Lofoten to spawn. It could well be argued that the ﬁsheries
in Lofoten has served as the birthplace of both monetary wealth
and stories, tales and mythologies that has helped shape a coastal
identity that remains important for many Norwegian coastal
communities. But the Lofoten region has also been subject to the
relentless varieties of nature, and at times been both conﬂict and
poverty ridden, – bankruptcies and personal failure could easily
follow success and wealth, as the cod could simply fail to appear, or
arrive in much smaller numbers than anticipated. Therefore, the
regulation of the ﬁshery resource – and of those who wanted to
utilize it – started early; indeed, in an amendment to one of the
ﬁrst Norwegian laws written, the Frostatingslov from the 11th
century, the ﬁsheries of Lofoten were already regulated, and in
1816, a separate law concerning ﬁsheries in the Lofoten seas was
established, regulating through managing sea plots, ﬁshnet
direction and type of ﬁshing gear. Also, the rights to trade on –
and collect taxes from – this lucrative business was controlled by
the state; many in fact argue that the very urge to gather the old
Norwegian smaller kingdoms under one rule in the 10th Century
came from a need to control trade and taxation in the north, and in
particular the ﬁsh trade emanating from Lofoten (Jaklin, 2006;
Jensen,2012).
Today, Lofoten consists of six municipalities, and a majority of
the population lives mostly in and in close proximity to the two
small towns of Svolvær and Leknes, in addition to around thirty
small ﬁshing villages. The number of ﬁshers and ﬁsh traders has
declined rapidly the last two decades, and thus the relative
importance of other trades and sources of income has risen
substantially, in effect creating a more versatile and ﬂuid labour
market, again particularly in the larges communities and towns.
However, the challenges typical for regions in the outskirts of
things are also found in Lofoten; a declining and aging population
(although in recent years a small increase has actually been
observed) due to low birth rates and young adult outmigration, a
lack of infrastructure investment enabling business to compete
with more centrally positioned competitors, a chronic scarcity of
risk capital and relatively scarce municipal ﬁnances meant to
ensure that basic needs and services are provided for inhabitants.
It is in this setting the question of petroleum development and
the potential beneﬁts it could bring to coastal communities was
introduced, and although the matter had been debated on and off
for at least two decades before, the issue became a political hot
topic only after the release of the ﬁrst management plan for the
Barents and Lofoten seas in 2006–and reached a heated peak
during the revision process of this plan from 2008 to 2011. Based on
the political developments up to 2015, however, one can with
almost complete certainty claim that the debate will continue also
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politics seems almost destined, every once in a while, to “look to
Lofoten”.
4. Lofoten and petroleum in national politics 2001–2017
In September 2013, the new Prime Minister of Norway, Mrs Erna
Solberg, presented an agreement between four political parties,
which would constitute the parliamentary basis for a new
Norwegian cabinet. One of the political bargains her Conservative
Party had to succumb to in order to get this platform settled, was a
postponement on the petroleum issue concerning the Lofoten,
Vesterålen and Senja regions (abbr. LoVeSe) of Northern Norway
was to be postponed until after the parliamentary period was
over—that is, until the year 2017, an absolute demand from the two
smaller parties supporting the new cabinet. With this decision, the
new Solberg cabinet continued a political strategy that has kept the
decision of how to strategically plan for future development in this
area at bay since 2001.
In the period after the general elections in 2013, Norwegian
petroleum has met with at least two severe challenges beyond
their control. One is the sudden and somewhat unforeseen
plummeting of oil prices in 2014– a price fall that has revealed
to its full extent the dependency of the Norwegian economy on
petroleum5; the other the climate change conference in Paris in
December 2015 and the pressing need for politicians to show their
ability to act on climate change. These two overarching processes
has led to a reiﬁed notion of urgency in both proponents and
opponents to petroleum development in the LoVeSe region;
opponents are urging for a permanent ban on all petroleum
development, whilst the petroleum sector and their supporters
argue that the best prospects available – ﬁrst amongst them
LoVeSe – should be made available as soon as possible.
The wait has indeed been long, they argue. In 2001, the ﬁrst
cabinet of former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg issued a stop
order on test drilling in the area, due to a combination of political
pressure and scientiﬁcally based concerns on the fragility of the
marine areas and its ecosystems; an area where a substantial part
of the total amount of ﬁsh Norway catches spawns (Fiskeridir-
ektoratet, 2013). The following Bondevik II cabinet issued what in
hindsight is seen as the basis for the now well-established
Norwegian high north strategy (Norway, 2001), a strategy that lay
the foundations for an ecosystem-based approach to management
of sea areas and resources (Dale, 2011; Misund and Olsen, 2013). In
2006, the ﬁrst ecosystem based management plan for the Barents
and Lofoten seas was released. The plan presented the complexities
of multi-user needs and concerns together with a realization of a
lack of knowledge about what was considered fragile ecosystems.
These concerns pushed the government to initiate processes
aiming at ﬁlling knowledge gaps (Knol, 2010) and ensuring
stakeholder and actor participation and co-management rights
(Olsen, et al., 2007a,b; Johnsen, Hersoug et al., 2014: 7).
The complex balancing act of both ensuring actor participation
rights and a (scientiﬁc) knowledge-based approach where the
well-being of ecosystems was highlighted proved a difﬁcult
political challenge for the Norwegian authorities. I will here argue
that an analysis of to what extent the decision making processes
here presented are understood as inclusive and participatory by a
broad range of stakeholders is important, and further, that an
analysis of the principles of governance as (a) governmentality can5 The fall in prices continued well into 2015, seeing prices as low as US 41 per
barrel for WTI Crude, and Brent at US 48 on August 20th, 2015. Source: http://
multimedia.dn.no/nyheter/energi/2015/08/20/0737/Oljepris/ny-bunn-for-oljepri-
sene, accessed August 30th, 2015.shed further light on how natural resources are managed and
governed. Before the analysis I will describe the main arguments of
this analytical perspective.
5. Understanding governance as governmentality
In general, governance simply means to govern, in other
words, it can cover all patterns of rule, all systems of government.
More speciﬁcally though, governance is identiﬁed as a type of
government where the state is dependent upon others or where
the state plays a minor or no role, and signiﬁes speciﬁc changes in
the role of the state as provider of security and well-being for its
citizens, – processes such as the public sector reforms in 1980s and
1990s called New Public Management or The Third Way (Giddens,
1998; Bevir, 2009: 9–11). In such processes, focus was diverted
from the hierarchical bureaucracy as basis for policy deﬁnition and
implementation and to markets, quasi-markets and stakeholder
networks. In other words, liberalization and privatization meant
that services formerly provided by the state now could be provided
by others. Thus actors both within and beyond the state itself was
provided the right to participate in decision making processes and
in decision making networks.
This means that the state still is important, but now more as a
facilitator of processes and the conducting actor, ensuring
implementation; its role more being to steer and facilitate for
stakeholders instead of issuing commands (Kooiman 1999: 73).
This transfer of power to networks did not, however, render the
state with less power, as it still facilitates and to a large extent holds
the power to decide the basis for inclusion (and exclusion) of
actors, meanings, knowledges and sentiments in decision making
processes. Importantly, knowledge is a major provider of
legitimacy – and thus provides the power to plan, to decide – and to
rule. In other words, «knowledge» constitutes a rationale for a
governmentality upon which governance – the act of governing
through facilitating for and participating in networks – is based.
Governance processes often display an unrealistic goal of
reaching real co-management and stakeholder inﬂuence. The
reasons for this are many – and may vary across scales – here only a
few, general points will be mentioned:
– There is a lack of attention to the complexity and multiplicity of
«risk society» challenges (Beck, 1992; Bäckstrand, 2003; Lupton,
2006; Mythen and Walklate, 2006): That is, a belief that the
complex puzzle of a multiple risks and challenges in (the post-
modern, post-industrial) society can be solved one piece at a
time; in one sector after the other, and that, when cross-sectoral
initiatives are made – as with the ecosystem-based manage-
ment plan – the hierarchical relationship between these sectors
becomes apparent in that the interest and/ or world views of one
tend to outperform another;
– The processes often ignores the role and power of expertise in de
facto excluding others: The focus on scientiﬁcally based
knowledge and logics necessarily excludes groups, viewpoints
and types of knowledge deemed «unscientiﬁc» or «based on
emotions or idealism», in addition to all those who are unable to
understand the tribal language of techno-scientiﬁc reasoning
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, Jasanoff, 1990; Bäckstrand, 2003;
Jentoft, 2006). In addition, it is underestimated that politics very
often sets the parameters for science that is to be used for
management – they seek applicable knowledge; i.e. knowledge
that can be used as basis for politics –; and
– Governance processes seeks to adhere to democratic principles
(often, in fact, democracy is seen as a prerequisite for governance
processes to be successful) while resting on a relation between
scientiﬁc knowledge production and politics where the question of
accountability is unresolved. As Mark Bevir has shown, “ . . . (t)
6 See http://www.seapop.no/no/about/ and http://www.mareano.no/om_mar-
eano for a presentation of the main ﬁndings of these programmes. Accessed June
5th, 2014.
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and responsible government in accordance with the will of the
majority” (Bevir, 2009: 27). This illustrates the curious
relationship between governance as method for policy con-
struction and implementation and its apparent lack of
accountability schemes replacing or supporting the traditional
relationship between politicians, public servants and the
(voting) public (ibid: 25–26).
These critical points are backdrops for a focus on how
governance processes can be understood as a governmentality
(that is, as a governing of mentalities), a concept derived from
Foucault (2007, 2008, 2010). This is a concept with a broad appeal
across a variety of disciplines. Michell Dean suggests it should
primarily be seen as a critical analytical approach which “ . . .
engages in the restive interrogation of what is taken as given”
(Dean 2010: 3), and thus as an analytics of political practice which
seeks to unravel the ideas, the ideologies, the rationale behind
politics.
In an often quoted passage from his lecture on February 1st,
1978 at the College de France, Foucault deﬁned governmentality as
being three things, the ﬁrst being “ . . . the ensemble of
institutions, procedures, analyses and reﬂections, calculations
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very speciﬁc, albeit very
complex, power that has the population as its target, political
economy as its major form of knowledge (my emphasis), and
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument”
(Foucault 2007: 108). Political economy is here seen as the
rationale within which interactions between political institutions,
managerial systems and economics are understood. Marlow
(2002) has suggested that an analytics of government should
focus on “ . . . forms of governmental thought, realms and frames
of assumed knowledge, particular tacit rationalities and logics,
means of calculation and strategies . . . (Marlow op.cit: 244)” – a
suggestion that does not exclude types of governmentality other
than that of liberalism, but rather opens for an analysis of the
“ . . . programmatic claims of liberalism” (ibid: 9) of freedom and
individual right to self-governance is part of a regime of
government which has as its ultimate aim the securing of
populations. Therefore, an analytics of government (which
includes government of self, a necessary aspect of freedom) will
ultimately be involved in the quest for how particular notions of
‘truth’ are constructed.
One such pool of “truths” comes from economics. In research
adhering to notions of governmentality, economics is to be
regarded analytically as a tool of governance, but is just as often
found to be the knowledge system that deﬁnes the very rationale of
governance. In short, what pays of economically will often prevail.
This particular power/knowledge nexus – the objectiﬁed logics of
scientiﬁcally based politics coupled with an economic rationality –
is in a governmentality approach understood through an analysis
of processes of knowledge production, both within the accepted
realm of science and beyond. Hence, the inclusion/exclusion
criteria and the power to deﬁne them are important objects of
analysis.
Another pool of “truths” is produced by science, and relevant for
this discussion is the way the management of offshore resources in
Northern Norway is based on the premise that the progress of
scientiﬁc know-how will improve our ability to both protect the
environment and exploit the resources of the area – a premise that
constitutes the boundary of a particular ‘culture of knowledge’, or
what Michell Dean calls “a regime of practices”:
“ . . . a relatively stable ﬁeld of correlation of visibilities,
mentalities, technologies and agencies, that constitute a kind of
taken-for-granted point of reference for any form of problem-
atization”. (Dean 2010: 37)One example of such a regime of practices, I claim, is the
Norwegian Management regime of natural resources and ecosys-
tems. In order to study this regime as politics it is not sufﬁcient to
study who participates, what is said and what decisions are being
made. Instead there is a need for a focus on how it is a part of a set
of technologies aiming towards establishing and re-establishing
regimes of truth where the state as a political actor is enabled as
security provider, where an effect of this is the way these same
processes also creates insecurity within population, because
peoples own postulates as to what secures them are excluded
from the political decision processes. One therefore runs the risk of
alienating individuals and communities because of a political
ambition of adhering to an ideal of governance dominated by a
culture of specialists within speciﬁc knowledge ﬁelds - like
ecosystem sustainability, petroleum politics, geopolitics and
liberalist economics - identiﬁed in national High North strategies
as being of particular importance for state politics.
Below I will use the theoretical framework that I have presented
in an analysis of how the inclusion and exclusion of different
knowledges in fact constitutes a process of governing mentalities
just as much as governing actions, as it reiﬁes a notion of “truth”
largely based on scientiﬁc criteria.
6. The governing of resources and mentalities
In April 2010, a scientiﬁc report was published (von Quillfeldt,
2010a,b) with contributions from a Scientiﬁc Forum, a Risk analysis
group and a Monitoring group These were experts nominated by
institutional stakeholders named by the Norwegian government
who was to report back to policy makers on the state of the
ecosystems of the area and give advice on how to manage them.
The aim of this report was to lay the foundation for a revision of the
Management plan for the Barents and Lofoten Seas. Most of the
300+ pages document is concerned with current status of plant
species -, ﬁsh- and marine mammal stocks and the interdepen-
dencies of the ecosystems within which they all belong. Included in
the marine ecosystem monitoring are the most important effects of
different kinds of human activities. The Barents Sea is identiﬁed –
both in this report and elsewhere (AMAP 2002; ACIA 2005; AMAP
2009) – as an ‘early warning area’ concerning the effects of climate
change, long-range pollution and accumulation of persistent toxic
pollutants in ecosystem food chains where humans reign on top. In
this regard, the report can be seen ﬁrst and foremost as being a
state-of-science-on-the-environment assessment and was not
meant to be backing speciﬁc arguments in the political debate
concerning petroleum. Still, it has had a major inﬂuence on how
politics concerning the areas is conducted.
The report was presented at a press conference where most of
the allotted time was used to describe the condition of the natural
habitats of the management area, focusing explicitly on the
knowledge production that had been initiated by the previous
evaluation of the management plan of 2006. In particular, the
ﬁndings from two major scientiﬁc programs, in which the seabed
and oceanic and seabird populations of the region were mapped
and assessed, were thoroughly presented.6 Most importantly for
our purpose is the ramiﬁcations these assessments have for the
evaluation of particular valuable and vulnerable areas closed for
petroleum activity in the previous management plan of 2006 out-
side the LoVeSe area. The conditions under which these assess-
ments are made are the result of pressure from both political,
economic and environmental interests - which are not necessarily
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knowledge to the equation (Knol 2010: 62). As such, the report
should only be regarded as part of the needed basis for a political
decision, as it does not include important elements concerning how
people are enabled (or ‘un-abled’) to live their lives locally as a
result of national political decisions.
It is important for the analysis here to emphasize the
signiﬁcance in maintaining a stringent divide between what is
the scientiﬁc basis for the process – consistently referred to as the
“factual” basis for the Management plan – and the participatory
governance process, in which a number of actors and stakeholders
were given their chance to inﬂuence the decision making process.7
The gatekeepers of the Scientiﬁc Forum, the institutions that were
give the role as knowledge providers to the Forum report ensured
that the report would act as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer,
1989) carrying
“ . . . different meanings in different worlds but their structure
is common enough to more than one world to make them
recognizable, a means of translation. The creation and
management of boundary objects is a key process in developing
and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds”
(ibid: 393),
acting as both a marker and a translator between the realms of
science and politics. An important aspect of the argument
presented here is that within a speciﬁc governmentality – one
where techno-scientiﬁc knowledge dominates the power/ knowl-
edge nexus of politics – the importance of being included in the
knowledge base which ultimately will be seen as the “factual basis”
for the political discussions to follow cannot be underestimated, as
one would be seen as a provider of “truth”, not as a stakeholder
with either economic, ideological, social or cultural motive for
political action.
The construction of this knowledge-base for an ecosystem-
based management scheme informing political decisions concern-
ing the marine areas off the North-Norwegian coast has had a
major inﬂuence on the debate concerning potential development
of the petroleum resources believed to be located in the waters
outside LoVeSe. The assumption behind this analysis is that this
regime of political practice is reafﬁrmed through two processes.
The ﬁrst pertains to the inclusion and exclusion of what is
considered to be relevant knowledge, perspectives and actors.
The second relates to the process through which the aim of
scientiﬁc and political consensus is pursued. Here, questions
concerning society’s relation to nature and how to manage, control
and utilize it become paramount. Following Mary Douglas, the
analysis reﬂects how
“ . . . the consequence of using science as a basis for politics is
that both sides consult their own scientiﬁc experts” (Douglas,
1992),
a point which contrary to popular and political belief seems to
render science unable to enable politics, and that complementary
policy advice from outside of the power/knowledge nexus in which
scientiﬁc principles rules is increasingly important, but not within
the particular governmentality of Norwegian offshore resources
called an ecosystem-based management scheme.87 Telephone interview, von Quillfeldt, op.cit.
8 In fact, in the case at hand, popular sentiments and alternative ways of
understanding the relationship between the value of ecosystems, natural resources
and extractive resources has inﬂuenced national policy, as it has been the most
important basis for a political alternative to the strong national narrative of
consensus and co-existence between petroleum, ﬁsheries and environmental
protection as a pathway not only possible but also as the morally and politically
correct thing to do. For a more thorough discussion of these matters, see Dale (2011)
and Kristoffersen and Dale (2014).The build-up to the release of the report had been massive, and
to a large degree based on the expectations of the proponents and
opponents of petroleum production in LoVeSe. Even though it had
been stressed for months before that the report would not come up
with a deﬁnitive answer to the question and that advocates for the
many other concerns – environmental, industrial, developmental
and so on – had tried to make their cases heard, it was the matter of
petroleum which overshadowed most other concerns. I will
therefore brieﬂy describe to what extent the Forum report deals
with the petroleum issue, and analyze to what extent the gate-
keeping – qualities of the report are maintained also here; in other
word, to what extent economic concerns about the availability of
these areas for petroleum development is inﬂuential in the report.
Initially, petroleum production is described as just one of
several human activities impacting the state of the ecosystems in
the area. In Chapter 3.1, the interest from the petroleum industry
for access to areas in the management area is described as
profound (von Quillfeldt, 2010: 36). Initially, the chapter focuses on
the assessment of undiscovered petroleum resources in the area,
which are thought to amount to about 30 per cent of the remaining
resources yet to be discovered on the Norwegian shelf (von
Quillfeldt, 2010: 36).9 Reference to governmental policies within
the petroleum sector indicates however that the long-term
utilization of the area is necessary, if Norway is to maintain its
expected level of production (and thus a steady ﬂow of income for
the state) as described in government economic strategy plans
(Norway, 2009). In other words: inscribed as part of the rationale
for a management plan for the area is the long-term political goal
of maintaining a high level of activity on the Norwegian petroleum
shelf, an activity level which (as seen by the industry) presupposes
access to the undiscovered resources in the area. Therefore, it is
important to note that even if the management plan is intended to
be a plan for an environmental policy for the sea areas in question,
its ﬁndings will also have possible ramiﬁcations for national
economy, for geopolitical strategies and for the future of the
Norwegian petroleum state. It is intriguing to ﬁnd that one in the
Scientiﬁc Forum Report – on the scientiﬁc state-of-things
concerning the management of resources and ecosystems – ﬁnds
it pertinent to present arguments for why it would be in the
interest of us all to open for petroleum activities in the area (ibid:
37). I argue here that these arguments in essence have little to do
with how to secure an ecosystem based management of the area,
and is a ﬁnding based on the analytical approach of seeking to
understand the governing of mentalities, reifying a notion of a
speciﬁc power/knowledge nexus inﬂuencing also the production of
knowledge.
Besides arguing for the inclusion of petroleum resources as part
of an ecosystem-based management report, it is the assessment of
risks involved in potentially utilizing them that is given the main
focus when discussing petroleum activities in the area. Details
about allowed minimum for produced water, emulsion mud,
drilling ﬂuids and so on during ‘normal activities’ (deﬁned as
“everything except occurrences of unintended emissions” (ibid))
are listed, as well as requirements for oil spill preparedness in case
of unintended occurrences. The report lists existing production
activity in the South Barents Sea, with a primary focus on the
productivity and potential production outcome of the wells drilled
as well as a brief description of search drillings and relief wells,
before describing the gathering of seismic data by the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate (OD) in 2007–2009 – a process that spurred9 The ﬁgure in this report is based on information issued by the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) before their analysis of seismic data acquired in the
Lofoten and Vesterålen Sea areas in 2007–2009, ﬁgures that were issued in a
separate NPD-report the day after the report from the Scientiﬁc Forum was released.
10 Personal communication, private business owner, Lofoten, June 8, 2010.
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other local actors as well as environmentalists and ‘green-labelled’
politicians nationally. Again, it is interesting to note how
commercial production of petroleum is matter-of-factly inscribed
in the report as an undisputed part of an ecosystem-based
management scheme, for instance seen in statements like “( . . . )
the seismic data material is considered to be sufﬁcient for the
necessary scientiﬁc evaluation of possibilities for petroleum to be
made, which in turn will strengthen the basis for a new updated
management plan” (ibid: 40).
Many have argued that the need for knowledge about how to
manage the ecosystems of the region should not – in principle –
include assessments of amounts of hydrocarbons beneath the
ocean ﬂoor. It is therefore interesting to note that out of the
approximately NOK 500 million spent on ‘increasing the knowl-
edge base’ for a new management plan, NOK 400 million was spent
on the gathering of seismic data, i.e. data that does not add
knowledge about the possible consequences of human activities to
the marine ecosystems – only the potential for ﬁnding hydro-
carbons – and instead potentially stirs resentment to and produce
questions concerning the aim of the ecosystem-based manage-
ment plan. For what might it cost us to protect an area against the
risks petroleum development might represent?
What is interesting is that this knowledge, pertaining to the
possibility that there might potentially be petroleum in the areas,
is included as important knowledge to consider when managing
the areas with a particular focus on ecosystems. In other words –
the economic potential it represents is seen as information
belonging to the basis upon which decisions about ecosystem
management is to be based. This expert produced, techno-
scientiﬁc knowledge – indicating economic potential – is therefore
included, again concurrent with the reigning power/knowledge
nexus of Norwegian resource management. Local concerns to the
contrary – that is, to what extent the potential for petroleum
development might threaten the possibility for development of
other economic sectors and potentially degrades quality of life is
not as easily argued for within the knowledge gathering process,
but is deﬁned as political, or ideological, arguments.
7. The hearing conference
In June 2010, approximately 250 delegates participated at a
hearing conference in Svolvær, Lofoten, where the revision of the
Integrated Management Plan for the Barents and Lofoten seas was
on the agenda (abbr. IMP-BL). This conference is a representative
example of a series of events in which the Forum report was
discussed, and the inclusion and exclusion premises for what is
seen to constitute the factual basis for the political decision to be
made the were reconﬁrmed and re-established.
The Minister of the Environment at the time, Mr. Erik Solheim,
opened the conference by acknowledging what he perceived of as a
particular strength of Norwegian management practices, that
people with different opinions can join in and discuss the issue at
hand, and that a knowledge-based debate ensures that we achieve
the best possible result. In particular, he was proud that the
ecosystem was in focus when discussing management, and that
every possible inﬂuence on its well-being would be taken into
account. He also proclaimed that the report showed clearly which
areas was in need of special care and protection. His speech was
heavily based on a trust in science’s ability to map, assess, evaluate
– and conclude with a high level of certainty. Thus, he emphasized
trust as an important inclusion/ exclusion criteria and as the
preferable basis for the debate to follow.
Minister Lisbet Berg Hansen, in charge of ﬁshery politics and
coastal matters, spoke of the importance of the foodstuff we harvest
from the sea, its position in the international market place, and thatthescientiﬁcknowledge aboutbiological lifewasvaluable ifweare to
manage our marine wealth in the best possible way. She emphasized
the role of the state as a provider of welfare and security, and its need
for adequate mapping, surveillance and scientiﬁc assessments in
order to enable policy makers to make the best possible decisions.
According to the Minister, it is up to the state to ensure the viability of
life at sea and the continued viability of local communities, through
national policies that arrange for continue growth and commercial
success within parameters set by an active resource management
scheme. This includes the Norwegian petroleum sector. In her
statement the minister thus adhered to the advancement of a politics
of truth resting on establishing the necessary framework within
which people manage themselves.
Finally, the Minister for petroleum, Mr. Terje Riis Johansen
stepped up to the podium, extending his gratitude to the
researchers and bureaucrats for their “collection and systematiz-
ing” of knowledge as basis for the work ahead. For petroleum, the
work done mirrored the important aspect, said the Minister, that
under normal circumstances, the effect of petroleum production
on oceanic ecosystems is perceived as a low risk activity. The
management of resources in Norwegian waters is based on co-
existence, he continued, where there should be a place also for
petroleum – “where we want it”. He argued that the Norwegian
experience concerning risk management has been a success, but
did remind the audience that things had changed after the
Deepwater Horizon-accident in the Mexican Gulf that same spring.
Extreme events will potentially inﬂuence national policies on
allocation of petroleum ﬁelds, he said. He noted that extreme
events may have extreme effects which in turn will have a
inﬂuence on how we deﬁne risk levels.
The conference had been awaited with anticipation, and seen as a
possibility for local stakeholders to be heard, to take part, - but
something curious happened: In the hall, at least two dozen local
people were present whom I knew from my ﬁeldwork experiences
had strong opinions on the matter and who rarely hesitated to speak
their mind. However, in this setting, only one of them commented on
the lack of inclusion of local knowledge about the ecosystems
described in the report. He was a local ﬁsherman who pointed out
that he did not recognize the simulations in the report of how an oil
spill in LoVeSe would spread. He referred to his 20 years of
experience with ocean currents and claimed that the model could
not possibly account for local current conditions. He feared that a
potential oil spill would spread far beyond the area that the models
that the Norwegian Veritas (DNV) presented in the report. The
representative from DNV acknowledged and admitted that while the
models were the most advanced to date, they still did not have the
capacity to include the complexities of local currents in this region.
Thus, it was admitted, local knowledge could indeed be seen to be
very relevant for decisions to be made concerning oil spill
prevention, but was, for technical and methodological reasons not
included in the models presented. This effectively excluded local
knowledge as a basis for the revision of the management plan -
knowledge that admittedly could have been of importance for risk
assessments and ultimately for political decision making.
As days and weeks passed, a comment made to me by a local
business man on our way out of the conference was repeated by a
surprisingly high number of otherwise wordy and strong headed
stakeholders –
“There was nothing more to say. The ministers closed the doors on
all the things I thought was important.”10
Without suggesting a deliberate exclusion of local voices from
the meeting, I will argue that the presence of no less than three
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speciﬁc power/ knowledge nexus that left little room for non-
scientiﬁc valuations of nature, landscapes and resources beyond
those that can be objectively accounted for in capitalization value.
In particular, all three ministers explicitly associated themselves
with a political regime of practices that sets parameters on what
knowledge is to be taken seriously. Typically arguing within the
rationale of a neoliberalist governmentality (Marlow, 2002; Elden,
2007; Hamann, 2009; Dean, 2010), the ministers all upheld the
production of scientiﬁc knowledge and a connection to the logics
of the market (Foucault, 2007) as imperative for the decision which
was to be made on matters of management of resources (including
a decision on whether to continue to deﬁne the sea areas outside
Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja as in need of special protection for
also the next management plan period). When Minister Solheim
referred to “a knowledge-based debate”, the knowledge he spoke
of was heavily based on a trust in science’s ability to map, assess,
evaluate – and conclude with a high level of certainty. Thus, he
emphasized trust in science as an important inclusion/ exclusion
criteria (Foucault, 2007; Dean, 2010) and as the preferable basis for
the debate to follow. Minister Berg Hansen, in charge of ﬁshery
politics and coastal matters in the cabinet, spoke of the importance
of the foodstuff we harvest from the sea, its position in the
international market place, and that the scientiﬁc knowledge we
can obtain about biological life was valuable if we are to manage
our wealth at sea in the best possible way. She emphasized the role
of the state as provider of welfare and security, and its need for
adequate mapping, surveillance and scientiﬁc assessments in
order to enable policy makers to make the best possible decisions.
And ﬁnally, the Minister in charge of petroleum politics, Mr. Riis
Johansen made explicit the relation between threats and
possibilities typical for a technology of management of contingen-
cy based on a scientiﬁc calculation of risks and possibilities, and
that petroleum not only could but should be a part of the equation,
because the beneﬁts are so large that they justify taking the risk.
I will argue that this analysis in fact reveals a paradoxical anti-
democratic virtue of the power/knowledge nexus here described.
In the words of Shelia Jasanoff,
“we regard a particular factual claim as true not because it
accurately reﬂects what is out there in nature, but because it has
been certiﬁed as true by those who are considered competent to
pass upon the truth and falsify on that kind of claim”. (Jasanoff,
1990: 13)
It is worth mentioning – as we are discussing to what extent the
ideals of governance of co-operation and co–management actually
means that different voices, different ontologies has inﬂuence – that
none of the written hearing statements, nor the comments from the
few who were given the opportunity to speak were included in the
ﬁnal version of the report, the de facto main knowledge base upon
which the political decision (i.e. the acceptance of the management
plan bythe Norwegianparliament) was taken. The presence of these
hearing statements on the government web simply underlines this
point; they are included in the process, but not in the ﬁnal product,
and thus not acknowledged as knowledge.11
8. Summary and conclusion: The management process as a
technology of security
With the implementation of a new, revised Management Plan
for the Barents and Lofoten seas (IMP-BL) a speciﬁc process in11 See http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kld/dok/hoeringer/hoeringsdok/2010/
horing—oppdatering-av-forvaltningsplan/horingsuttalelser.html?id=601948),
accessed September 9th, 2015.which a particular synthesis between power and knowledge - a
speciﬁc governmentality – is re-established. I argue that the
management plan regime is a technology of security (Foucault,
2007), as it is designed as a tool of governance based on a speciﬁc
governmentality, that of the coupling of (objectiﬁable) science and
a (neo) liberalist rationality – a tool meant to secure population
through managing resources. Questions about whether or not to
open for petroleum activities are thus answered by following the
criteria developed within the ruling power/knowledge nexus of
management of resources, as described in the foreword of the most
recent edition of the plan:
“The purpose of this management plan is to arrange for wealth
creation through a sustainable usage of resources and goods in
the Barents Sea and the sea areas outside Lofoten, while
simultaneously upholding the structure, function, productivity
and diversity of the ecosystems. The management plan is thus a
tool both for preparing for wealth creation and for maintaining
the environmental values of the sea.” (Norway, 2011: 6)12
With this tool – or technology – resources are mapped and
presented and thus naturalized as part of the state management
regime. Further, risks are analyzed and future possibilities
objectiﬁed and made coherent with a linear understanding of
progress and economic development. In this, the frontier
landscape of the north – clean, unspoiled, wild and primitive –
is presented with all its opportunities for development and
exploitation, but also as a place in which human activities are
accepted as being potentially problematic in terms of ecosystem
maintenance. The fact that three ministers were present at the
hearing conference for the Forum Report – which provided the
“factual basis” upon which the Management Plan was built – in
itself accentuated a framing of the debate representing the ruling
power/ knowledge nexus of managing resources in Norway. All
three ministers explicitly associated themselves with a political
regime of practices that sets parameters on what knowledge is to be
taken seriously, and they all upheld the production of scientiﬁc
knowledge and a connection to the logics of the market as
imperative for the decision which was to be made on matters of
management of resources in the integrated management plan.
It all leads to the matter of scientiﬁc, seemingly objective
authority, a matter in which most people are simply excluded from
being a qualiﬁed critique of the objectiﬁed knowledge presented.
Sheila Jasanoff writes: “When an area of intellectual activity is
tagged with the label “science”, people who are not scientists are
de facto barred from having a say about its substance; correspond-
ingly, to label something “not science” is to denude it of cognitive
authority” (ibid: 14)
Producing science is no objective task though, and the example
provided in this paper illustrates the extent of which the governing
of mentalities inﬂuences how and what knowledge is included –
and excluded – when governing resources, – a governmentality
based on a speciﬁc power/knowledge relation between the
governmental rationality of liberalism and objectivist science
(Dean, 2010). The processes here described show that a combina-
tion of Gregory Batesons plea for a focus of possible alternatives to
the way things are ruled and managed (Bateson, (1971): 286 and
the Foucauldian focus on the margins of society – on the
manifestations of the governmental processes in local (community
or individual) lives – opens for an analytics of experience-based
knowledge and why they should matter to politics regarding
whether to start petroleum development in the Lofoten area.
The case also highlights the way different knowledge systems
are – under the dominant techno-scientiﬁc governmentality –12 Author’s translation from the Norwegian original plan document.
16 B. Dale / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 9–16hierarchically deﬁned, and thus serves to strengthen the argument
that knowledge is indeed produced and never “ . . . exists in a pure
state, fully formed, merely awaiting its application in particular
places (Nadasdy 2011: 130). The argument here, thus, has been one
supporting the need for analysis of the governmentality that
supports presuppositions of absolute truth revealed through
scientiﬁc methods and processes and the power/knowledge nexus
it reiﬁes.
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